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Abstract
This Essay focuses on the relationship between the privacy and the retail payment systems
on the Internet. Part I of this Essay reviews several payment mechanisms that are in use or that
have been introduced for retail commerce on the Internet. The description is not intended to offer
a thorough study of the technology, but rather to highlight the data trail that is created under each
method. Part II reviews the relevant statutory and self-regulatory mechanisms that have been ap-
plied to the Internet to ensure privacy. This leads to a discussion of the European Community’s
data protection directive, Council Directive No. 95/46/EC (”EC Directive”). The EC Directive be-
came effective in October 1998, and its impact on the Internet is still uncertain, although the global
community is certainly taking it seriously. Part III begins with an analysis of the EC Directive,
followed by the proposal that the EC Directive may influence the direction of the development
of electronic currency towards an anonymous or un traceable product. This is a controversial
proposal on an interpretative level because of the national security and monetary concerns of gov-
ernments throughout the world. We have just begun our journey into the “information age,” and
the conclusion of this Essay suggests that thoughtful legal responses to technological changes are
needed.
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INTRODUCTION
As we approach a new millenium, it is appropriate to reflect
upon the social environment in which we live. Advancements in
telecommunications technology continue to impact dramatically
the way that we conduct our personal, social, and business lives.
Use of the Internet as a medium through which to transact busi-
ness has established an electronic commerce industry that gener-
ated US$73.9 billion in 1998 and that is projected to grow to
US$717 billion by 2001.1 As these technological and economic
achievements have evolved, the fundamental basic right to pri-
vacy of the participants has been compromised.2 This situation
is a result of both the unregulated nature of the Internet and the
sophistication of the technology that supports the infrastructure.
Telecommunications technology has exposed our private
lives on several levels. This Essay focuses on the relationship be-
tween the privacy and the retail payment systems on the In-
ternet. Digitization of information has begun to change the mu-
sic, software, and film industry, but arguably the greatest change
is being experienced in the area of generic information trans-
* Julia Alpert Gladstone is a Professor of Legal Studies at Bryant College in Smith-
field, Rhode Island. She is Chairperson of the American Bar Association's Committee
of the Law of Commerce in Cyberspace. Prior articles by the author that address legal
developments in cyberspace have appeared in various law reviews and business journals.
1. This data was collected by Activ Media in their fifth annual study of web-gener-
ated revenues. See E-commerce Revenues to Leap over $1.2 Trillion by 2002 (visited June 27,
1999) <http://sellitonthweb.com/ezine/news0043.shtml> (on file with the Fordham In-
ternational Law Journal).
2. CONSUMER ELECTRONIC PAYMENTS TASK FORCE, THE REPORT OF THE CONSUMER
ELECTRONIC PAYMENTS TASK FORCE (Apr. 1998) [hereinafter CONSUMER ELECTRONIC PAY-
MENTS] (addressing consumer concerns raised by emerging electronic money technolo-
gies); Mark E. Brudnitz, Privacy Protection for Consumer Transactions in Electronic Commerce:
Why Self-Regulation Is Inadequate, 49 S.C. L. REv. 847 (1998).
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fer.3 Consumers will pay for information according the benefit
or value received, and this economic behavior will define the "in-
formation age" of the twenty-first century.
While the volume of electronic commerce continues to in-
crease, there is consensus among various industry experts4 that
the consumer's desire to keep her buying behavior anonymous,
or at least unexposed, to unknown parties has tempered the
growth of Internet commerce. Part I of this Essay reviews several
payment mechanisms that are in use or that have been intro-
duced for retail commerce on the Internet. The description is
not intended to offer a thorough study of the technology, but
rather to highlight the data trail that is created under each
method. Part II reviews the relevant statutory and self-regulatory
mechanisms that have been applied to the Internet to ensure
privacy. This leads to a discussion of the European Community's
data protection directive, Council Directive No. 95/46/EC ("EC
Directive").' The EC Directive became effective in October
1998, and its impact on the Internet is still uncertain, although
the global community is certainly taking it seriously. Part III be-
gins with an analysis of the EC Directive, followed by the propo-
sal that the EC Directive may influence the direction of the de-
velopment of electronic currency towards an anonymous or un-
traceable product. This is a controversial proposal on an
interpretative level because of the national security and mone-
tary concerns of governments throughout the world. We have
just begun our journey into the "information age," and the con-
clusion of this Essay suggests that thoughtful legal responses to
technological changes are needed.
The infrastructure of open networks of computers con-
nected to one another, also known as the Internet, allows the
rapid creation, publication, and storage of information on an
international basis. Virtual communities have evolved where in-
3. Interview with Russ Jones, Market Development Director at Millicent; see A.
Michael Froomkin, Regulation and Computing and Information Technology, Flood Control on
the Information Ocean: Living with Anonymity, Digital Cash and Distributed Databases, 15J.L.
& COM. 395 (1996) (discussing information commerce).
4. See CONSUMER ELECTRONIC PAYMENTS, supra note 2, at ii. In addition, a 1998 poll
by Business Week magazine showed that 61% of those who do not use the Internet would
do so if personal information were protected.
5. Council Directive No. 95/46/EC of 24 October 1995 on the Protection of Indi-
viduals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of
Such Data, art. 2(c), O.J L 281/31, at 38 (1995) [hereinafter Directive].
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dividuals engage in business transactions or communicate about
intimate personal matters. While the technological innovations
that have lead to the development of "cyberspace" have im-
proved people's lives, they have also challenged social and eco-
nomic order.
I. ELECTRONIC RETAIL PAYMENT OPTIONS
A large number of individuals and businesses have chosen
to conduct their commercial activities by electronic means.
Spurred by convenience and efficiencies, the Internet is emerg-
ing as a shopping mall, not only for traditional physical products
similar to catalogue shopping, but also significantly as a market
for information that has developed on the Internet.6 The In-
ternet is a vast repository of information that may be viewed by
anyone, almost anywhere in the world. In addition, contribu-
tions to the repository are being made by millions of people on a
daily basis." Since its inception in 1969 as a communications
tool for academics and government officials, the Internet has
transformed the nature, use, and value of information to society.
As society places greater importance on information, an eco-
nomic market for information is emerging. Free access to World
Wide Web pages is being limited as information providers realize
the economic worth of their product and obtain the technology
to extract a fee for the material.
Commerce in information, and other digitally transferable
products, has led to the development of a number of different
digital means or medium to transfer units of value. There are
essentially two general categories or models for the exchange of
value on the Internet; they are the credit-debit card8 and digital
currency.
At the present time, credit cards are the most widely used
method of payment for Internet products.9 A credit card trans-
6. See Froomkin, supra note 3.
7. For a general discussion of the growth of electronic information available on
the Internet, see Joel Rothstein Wolfson, Symposium, Contract and the Copyright Are Not
at War, 87 CAL. L. REv. 79 (1999).
8. For a discussion of the relevant differences between debit and credit cards, see
Froomkin, supra note 3, at 450 n.211.
9. Peter P. Swine, Financial Privacy and the Theory of High-Tech Government Surveil-
lance (working paper) (visited Apr. 14, 1999) <http://www.acs.ohiostate.edu/units/
law/swirel/hightech.htm> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal).
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action on the Internet requires that the customer either e-mail
her credit card/personal identification details to the merchant
or enter the credit card information onto the merchant's web
page. In the later situation, which is becoming the preferred
method, the information is automatically encrypted using either
Netscape's Secure Socket Layer ("SSL") technology or the Se-
cure Electronic Transaction ("SET") standard.' The credit card
information then passes on the open Internet with little security
risk of copying or interception by a nefarious third party. Credit
card transactions are governed by Regulation E of the Electronic
Fund Transfer Act" ("EFTA"), which further protects the con-
sumer's interest by limiting her liability for misappropriation to
US$50.1 2
The issues of consumer privacy when using a credit card for
an online transaction are no different than in the physical world,
and the relevant legal protections apply. The vendor/merchant
maintains a record of the consumer's identity and product
purchased; the credit card issuer maintains a record of all
purchases of the credit card user. Consumers have accepted
such data collection practices in the physical world where the
average purchase is greater than ten dollars presumably by rely-
ing on the existing legal protections.'" The Internet informa-
tion market is much broader, more inclusive, and personally re-
vealing. This trend suggests that the consumer may not want to
create a credit card purchasing history of all the information
that she receives off the Internet. In addition, the transaction
costs of a credit card purchase may be prohibitive for the small
microtransactions that characterize retrieving information from
the Internet.
Several digital money schemes have been developed that fa-
cilitate electronic commerce for information products.'4 The
10. For a non-technical review of these technologies, see Wells Fargo, Small Busi-
ness Banking (visited Apr. 15, 1999) <http://www.wellsfargo.com/biz/merchant/
internet/secure> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal).
11. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1693r (1994 & Supp. 1997).
12. Id. For a thorough discussion of the application of Regulation E to digital
currency, see VARTANIAN ET AL., 21ST CENTURY MONEY, BANKING AND COMMERCE ch. 4
(1998).
13. See generally Elizabeth de Grazia Blumenfeld, Privacy Please: Will the Internet In-
dustry Act to Protect Consumer Privacy Before the Government Steps In?, 54 Bus. LAW. 349
(1998).
14. A precise definition of digital money is difficult to provide because it is an
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technology of the various digital currency models can either cre-
ate a complete audit trail that is more extensive than the credit
card purchasing record or provide greater anonymity than
cash. 5 All digital money protocols are actually a series of bits, or
packets of information, which are initially purchased by the con-
sumer for cash denominated in U.S. dollars, French francs, Ger-
man Deutsche marks, etc. The bits are aggregated and distrib-
uted to the consumer's computer and referred to as "tokens" or
"coins." Without cryptographic protections, these tokens could
be easily intercepted at any point in the creation, transmission,
or redemption process and used by a malevolent third party.
Therefore, all digital currency protocols contain algorithms that
act as locks on the information to provide security in the digital
currency transaction. A system of keys that is unique to each
digital currency protocol is used to decipher the algorithm or
cryptographic locks.
The differences in privacy protection provided by the differ-
ent digital currencies depend on the extent of information that
each party in the digital currency transaction is allowed, or re-
quired by the protocol, to access. For example, imagine that A
wishes to buy an item from B with digital currency. Under the
basic digital currency model, A deposits one hundred dollars in
Bank X, and Bank X issues a "token", or "coin," which is a series
of bits identified by a long random serial number.16 This "to-
ken" is on A's computer until she sends it to B in exchange for
the item. B can then convert the "token" into cash at Bank X.
The serial number on the "token" that was issued to A is unique;
thus, Bank X now has a record of A's completed purchase. This
form of digital currency has certain advantages over credit cards
for small value purchases particularly if the item purchased is
digital, but it offers no privacy advantage over credit cards.
On the opposite side of the privacy spectrum, there is the
digital currency protocol developed by David Chaum, who
founded Digicash Inc. The same basic "token" model is used
where the bank issues "tokens" to A in exchange for cash. Un-
evolving product. For an excellent review of the breadth of the industry, see Group of
Ten, Electronic Money: A Report of the Working Party on Electronic Money (visited Apr. 12,
1999) <http://www.bis.org/publ/index.htm> (on file with the Fordham International
Law Journal).
15. CONSUMER ELECTRONIC PAYMENTS, supra note 2.
16. See Froomkin, supra note 3, at 52.
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like the basic designated model, the serial number of the "to-
ken" is authored by A. Pursuant to a computer blinding process,
the serial number designated by A remains unknown to the
bank.17 Thus, when the bank redeems the "token" transferred
to it from A's merchant, it can verify its authenticity but cannot
identify it with A.
The dissemination of the Digicash model of digital currency
onto the Internet has been very limited." Law enforcement
agencies' concern that anonymous digital currency can be used
easily for money laundering, which threatens national security
on several fronts, indicates that certain legal prohibitions may be
imposed on these products. David Chaum has obtained patents
for the anonymous digital currency protocol, and while innova-
tive work is still being done in this area, to date no other fully
anonymous product has been brought to market.1 9 David
Chaum has thus far chosen not to license this patent, and Digi-
cash filed for bankruptcy protection in 1998 with no digital cur-
rency in circulation.
There is a digital currency model that offers a middle level
of privacy protection and has experienced limited success in sev-
eral market trials.2 1 Under this protocol, A purchases the digital
currency referred to as a "scrip," which can easily be broken into
smaller denominations. The "scrip" is cryptographically pro-
tected and purchased from a bank or broker. When A spends
the digital currency, the broker records the merchant that is re-
deeming the "scrip," but not what is being sold. The merchant
records what is sold and the serial number of the "scrip" for sub-
sequent redemption, but nothing more. Therefore, without col:-
lusion between the merchant and the broker, consumer privacy
is maintained and an audit trail is not readily or easily estab-
lished.
17. For a technical explanation of this protocol, see David Chaum, Achieving Elec-
tronic Privacy, Sci. AM., Aug. 1992 (visited Apr. 13, 1999) <http://www.digicash.com/
indexp.html> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal).
18. DigiCash Is Dead: Long Live DigiCash, FIN. TIMES LIMITED, Nov. 16, 1998.
19. For a collection of the work of Stefan Brands, which deals with Internet cash
systems, see Work of Stefan Brands (visited Apr. 13, 1999) <http://ganges.cs.tcd.ie/
mepeirce/Project/Mlists/brands.html> (on file with the Fordham International Law Jour-
nal).20. See Find Out What's New, What's Hot and What's Happening with MilliCent (visited
Apr. 12, 1999) <http://www.millicent.digital.com> (on file with the Fordham Interna-
tional Law Journal).
9 ANONYMOUS DIGITAL CURRENCY?
II. PRIVACY PROTECTION ON THE INTERNET
The privacy abuse concerns of the Internet user stem from
several areas. Personal information is obtained from users and
consumers with the use of online registrations, user surveys, or-
der forms, and affinity programs.21 In addition to these overt
methods, a computer technology commonly known as "cookies"
allows a web site owner to collect information about a visitor
without .the user even knowing that her visit was recorded. This
information may be obtained each time a user clicks her mouse
to surf the Internet.2 2 The threat to privacy increases substan-
tially as the separate individual pieces of personal information
are collected, categorized, catalogued, and even sold to third
parties.3
The data gathering potential of certain digital currency
models presents the greatest privacy intrusion of all because of
the extent and amount of information that can be obtained.
Most consumers are aware that a record of their financial trans-
actions is maintained by the participating financial institution,
but in a world where information is a highly valued commodity,
the use of digital currency presents an alarming intrusion into
one's daily life. In addition, it is likely that many of the laws that
apply to the traditional data gathering activities of financial insti-
tutions may not apply to digital currency.
The U.S. Constitution does not establish a fundamental
right to privacy; rather, any privacy protection is gleaned from a
desperate handful of U.S. Supreme Court cases that recognize a
privacy interest in certain intimate decisions. 24 Unlike the na-
tions of Western Europe that have universal privacy protections,
the current federal privacy legislation has evolved in a sectoral
process.25 The following section discusses several key statutes
that have the potential to apply to digital currency but have not
yet been so implemented.
21. See Swine, supra note 9.
22. A "cookie" refers to data files that allow the website owner to record the trail of
sites that a person visited. See generally Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Trans-
actions, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1193 (1998).
23. See Blumenfeld, supra note 13, at 355.
24. For an excellent examination of data protection and privacy law in the United
States, see PAUL M. SCHWARTZ & JOEL R. REIDENBERG, DATA PRIVACY LAw: A STUDY OF
UNITED STATES DATA PROTECTION (1996).
25. See generally P. Amy Monahan, Deconstructing Information Walls: The Impact of the
European Data Directive on U.S. Business, 29 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 275 (1998).
19131999]
1914 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 22:1907
EFTA and its consumer protection regulation, Regulation
E, address the right of customers who establish accounts at finan-
cial institutions from which funds can be electronically trans-
ferred. The act has six major substantive requirements, which
include obligations on financial institutions to disclose to the
customer the terms and conditions affecting electronic fund
transfers, the requirement to provide periodic account informa-
tion, and most notably, a limitation on consumer liability for un-
authorized transfers to US$50. 26 In the interest of consumer pri-
vacy, it would be desirable for similar requirements to be im-
posed on digital currency issuers. There has been much activity
on administrative and congressional levels to adapt EFTA and
Regulation E to digital currency payment products. In 1996, the
Federal Reserve Board addressed the treatment of electronic fi-
nancial products under Regulation E with its Stored Value Card
Proposal ("SVC Proposal") .27 The SVC Proposal, which distin-
guishes stored value products based upon the architecture and
function of the product, exempts low denomination value trans-
fers from the requirements of Regulation E. It appears unlikely
that digital currency schemes, which would facilitate information
purchases over the Internet, will be subject to the rules of Regu-
lation E.
The Fair Credit Reporting Act 28 ("FCRA") regulates the ac-
tivities of consumer reporting agencies. It provides that a con-
sumer report may be furnished only to a third party who has a
permissible purpose for using the information. The list of pre-
requisites for obtaining a consumer report is based upon finding
a legitimate business need.29 Information sharing among affili-
ated companies is permissible, provided the consumer has been
given the opportunity to opt out. Dissemination of raw transac-
tional information between a consumer and an entity, which in-
cludes credit reporting agencies and others, is unrestricted. Raw
data is distinguished from the formal "credit report" and given
less protection. Given the sophisticated ways in which raw data
can be organized, challenges to this distinction or exception may
26. 12 C.F.R. § 205.6(b) (1999).
27. See VARTANIAN ET AL., supra note 12, at 174.
28. Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681u (1994 & Supp. 1997).
29. For discussion of the provisions and operation of the Fair Credit Reporting
Act, see Ronald C. Claiborne, Credit Reports and the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 28 J. Ma-
SHALL L. REv. 365 (1995).
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be forthcoming. It seems likely that the data collected by digital
currency issuers would not fall within the definition of a "con-
sumer report" and therefore the provisions of the FCRA would
not protect digital currency users.
The Electronic Communications Protection Act of 198630
("ECPA") protects persons against the unauthorized intercep-
tion of electronic communication by the government and pri-
vate sector firms. Electronic communications is broadly defined
to include the transfer of signs, images, and sounds of any na-
ture by wire, electromagnetic, or photoelectronic systems. The
ECPA's Titles I and II address the treatment of electronic com-
munications in transit and stored communications respectively.
The act's prohibition against knowingly divulging the contents
of a communication in transmission is more comprehensive
than that for stored communications. The application of the
ECPA to digital currency remains largely untested. It appears
that finding protection will depend upon which point in the life-
cycle of the electronic commerce transaction the interception or
unauthorized access occurs.31
At the present time, digital currency payment systems are
being designed for private industry implementation. Thus, it
seems unlikely that laws limiting government access to informa-
tion would directly impact the activities of digital currency issu-
ers; a discussion of two of those laws follows. They are relevant,
however, because of the protections that they can provide issuers
from the government.
The Right to Financial Privacy Act of 197832 ("RFPA") is
designed to limit the federal government's collection, and use,
of customer records obtained from financial institutions. RFPA
requires prior or concurrent consent of the individual even
when the government agency uses its subpoena power to obtain
the bank record. The term "financial institutions" includes
banks, credit card issuers, credit unions, loan and trust compa-
nies, homestead, building and loan associations, or consumer fi-
nance institutions. The application of this law to digital cur-
rency issuers will depend on several factors, primarily, on
30. Electronic Communications Protection Act of 1986, §§ 2701-2711 (1994 &
Supp. 1997).
31. See VARTANIAN ET AL., supra note 12, at 350.
32. Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422 (1994 & Supp.
1997).
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whether issuers will be deemed to be "financial institutions" and
whether the transaction account of the digital currency issuer
falls within the definition of a "financial record."33
The Privacy Act of 1974"4 ("Privacy Act"), which was enacted
in response to the privacy intrusions of the Watergate era, bal-
ances the individual's privacy interest against the government's
need for individual information so that it can perform its public
interest function. Only such financial records that are "relevant
and necessary" to accomplish the federal agency's purpose may
be collected." Subsequent disclosure of the individual's infor-
mation can only be made with the consent of the person to
whom the information pertains. The Privacy Act provides for
civil remedies against the federal government, but does not pro-
vide a right for consumers against private parties.
Privacy issues in cyberspace were brought to the public's at-
tention when the Information Infrastructure Task Force
("IITF"), an interagency group formed by the Clinton Adminis-
tration, issued its report A Framework for Global Electronic Commerce
("Framework").36 The objective of the Framework was to provide
direction, policy, and guidelines to advance the development of
electronic commerce. The resounding message of the Frame-
work, which had been previously circulated and approved by key
Internet players, was for the government to adopt a laissez-faire
approach to regulating the Internet and to allow the private sec-
tor to lead. The Framework addressed the economic potential of
the Internet and endorsed its lack of a legal framework.
In the area of privacy, the Framework recommended that the
government defer to the "private sector efforts now underway to
implement, user friendly, self-regulatory privacy regimes."37 Sev-
eral self-regulatory initiatives have been formed to protect the
overall privacy interests of individuals that use the Internet and
engage in electronic commerce. The Individual Reference Serv-
ices Group ("IRSG"), which is composed of database companies,
has developed privacy principles that include restrictions on the
availability of information, allowing consumers access to col-
33. See CONSUMER ELECTRONIC PAYMENTS, supra note 2, at 27.
34. Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1994 & Supp. 1997).
35. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (e) (1).
36. PRESIDENT WILLIAM J. CLINTON & VICE PRESIDENT ALBERT GORE, JR., A FRAME-
WORK FOR GLOBAL ELECTRONIC COMMERCE (1997).
37. Id.
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lected information to ensure accuracy and certain opt-out provi-
sions. Members of IRSG agree to be annually reviewed by an
independent professional service to assess whether they are
meeting the IRSG's principles."8 While IRSG has established the
most comprehensive voluntary platform in the information sec-
tor, the newly emerging digital currency issuers are not likely to
view themselves as database companies, and they therefore
would not be subject to the IRSG principles.
Founded in 1993, the SmartCard Forum organized repre-
sentatives, primarily technology and financial services providers,
to discuss the interoperability of various smart card protocols.
They have developed their own set of privacy guidelines that en-
courage respect for the consumer's privacy expectations.3 9 The
principles limit the use, collection, and retention of customer
information, offer opt-out provisions for customers who choose
not to have personal data provided to third parties, and en-
courage third parties to use restraint with their use of informa-
tion. Issuer's online digital currency payment products that do
not employ a physical representation on a plastic card, however,
may not be obligated to adhere to the SmartCard Forum's prin-
ciples.
In September 1997, the American Bankers Association, the
Bankers Roundtable, the Consumer Bankers Association, and
the Independent Bankers Association of America joined to-
gether to adopt a common set of privacy guidelines that restrict
the collection, use, and retention of individual customer infor-
mation produced in a financial transaction. The guidelines es-
tablish procedures to ensure the accuracy of customer informa-
tion, to limit employee access and third-party use of the informa-
tion, and to provide opt-out opportunities for consumers.4 °
Although the institutions that have adopted these banking in-
dustry principles are working on several implementation plans,
38. Federal Trade Commission, Individual Reference Services: A Report to Congress
(Dec. 1997) (visited Apr. 12, 1999) <http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/privacy/wkshp97/irsdoc
1.htm> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal).
39. See Legal & Public Policy Committee, Smart Card Forum, Consumer Privacy and
Smart Cards - A Challenge and an Opportunity (visited Apr. 12, 1999) <http://www.
smartcrd.com/news/policy/privdoc.htm> (on file with the Fordham International Law
Journal).
40. See House Committee on Banking, U.S. House of Representatives (visited Apr.
12, 1999) <http://www.house.gov/banking/91897by2.htm> (on file with the Fordham
International Law Journal).
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the banking industry principles and the self-regulatory mecha-
nisms in general have not been successful in protecting the In-
ternet user's privacy.
The evidence suggests that the statutory and self-regulatory
mechanisms designed to protect the transactional privacy of In-
ternet users have not yet been successful. In March 1998, the
Federal Trade Commission conducted "surfdays" to observe the
data collection practices of many websites." The Federal Trade
Commission found that while fourteen percent of the sites had
provided notice of their information gathering practices, nearly
eighty-five percent of the websites surveyed collected personal
information without giving such notice.
III. EC DATA PRIVACY DIRECTIVE
Unlike the United States, the Western European nations
have treated privacy as a fundamental human right for decades
and have provided for its protection not only in their enacted
legislation, but also in their constitutions.4 2 Data protection stat-
utes directed at both public and private sector information
processing have been enacted in most European countries. The
transnational nature of data flows that are so integral to the phe-
nomenon of the Internet has caused concern for the members
of European Union. In 1980, the Organization for Economic
Co-operation and Development ("OECD") issued guidelines to
govern the privacy of transborder flows of personal data.4" The
United States was among the signatories to the guidelines, but
they are not binding and the United States has not acted to en-
force the provisions.
In 1995, citing advances in technology and market integra-
tion, the European Union created binding and enforceable leg-
islation to provide international individual data protection. The
EC Directive, titled in full, Directive on the Protection of Individ-
uals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the
Free Movement of Such Data,4 4 is binding on the member na-
41. See Federal Trade Commission, Privacy Online: A Report to Congress (June 1998)
(visited Apr. 12, 1999) <http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy3/toc.htm> (on file with
the Fordham International Law Journal).
42. See Monahan, supra note 25.
43. Organization for Economic Co-operation and Dev., Recommendation of the
Council Governing the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data,
Sept. 23, 1980, O.E.C.D. Doc. C(80)58 Final (1980), reprinted in 20 I.L.M. 422 (1981).
44. Directive, supra note 5, Oj. L 281/31 (1995).
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tions, and each country must enact its own implementing legisla-
tion. The EC Directive took effect in October 1998 with the vari-
ous nations meeting the EC Directive objectives independently.
Following a seventy-two point list of recitals, the EC Direc-
tive sets out its objectives, general rules, judicial sanctions, codes
of conduct, supervisory authority, implementation measures,
and conditions for transfer of data to third countries.45 It is
thorough in its approach to protecting the individual's right to
privacy in personal information by harmonizing the data protec-
tion laws of its members and ensuring that the data protection
survives transborder data flows to countries outside of the Euro-
pean Union.
The scope of the EC Directive is very broad, including the
processing of all personal data. "Processing" is defined as "any
operation or set of operations which is performed on personal
data, whether or not by automatic means," and "personal data" is
defined as "any information relating to an identified or identifi-
able natural person."46 Article 6 of the EC Directive sets out the
principles relating to data quality. It provides that personal data
may be collected for specific, explicit, and legitimate purposes
and not further processed.
The data controller, or "controller," which is defined as the
natural or legal person that "determines the purposes and
means of processing of personal data,"4 7 must inform the data
subject of the purpose for the personal information record and
the information must be kept accurate and up-to-date. Data sub-
jects are guaranteed access to review personal information, and
they must be given the right to refuse to have their personal data
transferred to a third party.
The most significant provisions of the EC Directive to indi-
viduals and businesses in the United States are provided in
Chapter IV, Transfer of Personal Data to Third Countries. The
EC Directive requires that any member that wishes to transfer
data to a non-member country must provide an "adequate level
of protection."" A workable definition of the standard of ade-
quacy has not yet emerged in the European Union. There are
45. Id.
46. Id. art. 2(a)-(b), O.J. L 281/31, at 38 (1995).
47. Id. art. 2(d), O.J. L 281/31, at 38 (1995).
48. Id. art. 25(1), O.J. L 281/31, at 45 (1995).
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exceptions to the prohibition against transferring information to
third countries that lack adequate protection. Generally, they
cover situations where the data subject has given his unambigu-
ous consent to the transfer, the transfer is necessary for the per-
formance or conclusion of a contract to which the data subject is
a party, the transfer is necessary to protect the vital interests of
the data subject, or the transfer is required for reasons of impor-
tant public interest.49
Industry experts and legal scholars agree that the EC Direc-
tive has focused the world's attention on the need for privacy on
the Internet. While Internet users in the United States have
some protections against privacy abuse, historically Americans
have not recognized that the processing of data itself may be
wrongful5 ° and can provide the basis for privacy violations. Elec-
tronic commerce is international, and a global response to the
EC Directive is forthcoming. The U.S. and Japanese govern-
ments have made public their efforts to comply with the EC Di-
rective.51
The majority of the literature in the United States that ana-
lyzes the EC Directive focuses on the provisions of Articles 25
and 26, which address the data transfer to third countries and
the derogation from those restrictions. 2 Less attention has
been given to Article 7, The Criteria for Making Data Processing
Legitimate. It is helpful to see that the derogations in Article 26
follow the terms of Article 7, describing the methods for lawful
data processing. For example, under Article 26, a transfer of
personal data to a third country that lacks adequate levels of pro-
tection may take place on the condition that:
(a) the data subject has given his consent unambiguously to
the proposed transfer; or
49. Id. art. 26, O.J. L 281/31, at 46 (1995).
50. See PETER P. SWINE & ROBERT E. LITAN, NONE OF YOUR BUSINESS: WORLD DATA
FLOWS ELECrRONIC COMMERCE AND THE EUROPEAN PRIVACY DIRECrVE (1998).
51. Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry has established a newJap-
anese Industrial Standard JISQ1500 to create data private protection. According
Michael Power, Assistant Director, Policy Treasury Board of Canada,Japan's regulations
are in part in response to the EC Directive. The U.S. Department of Commerce has
issued for comment International Safe Harbor Privacy Principles, which are designed to
avoid a trade war with the European Union rising from the EC Directive.
52. See, e.g., Patrick J. Murray, Comment, The Adequacy Standard Under Directive 95/
46/EC: Does U.S. Data Protection Meet This Standard?, 21 FoRDHAm INr'L L.J. 932 (1998);
Monahan, supra note 25; SWINE & LITAN, supra note 50.
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(b) the transfer is necessary for the performance of a con-
tract between the data subject and the controller or the
implementation of precontractual measures taken in re-
sponse to the data subject's request; or
(c) the transfer is necessary for the conclusion or perform-
ance of a contract concluded in the interest of the data
subject between the controller and a third party; or
(d) the transfer is necessary or legally required on important
public interest grounds, or for the establishment, exer-
cise or defence of legal claims; or
(e) the transfer is necessary in order to protect the vital inter-
ests of the data subject; or
(f) the transfer is made from a register which according to
laws or regulations is intended to provide information to
the public and which is open to consultation either by the
public in general or by any person who can demonstrate
legitimate interest, to the extent that the conditions .laid
down in law for consultation are fulfilled in the particular
case.
53
Article 7 states that personal data may be processed only if:
(a) the data subject has unambiguously given his consent; or
(b) processing is necessary for the performance of a contract
to which the data subject is party or in order to take steps
at the request of the data subject prior to entering into a
contract; or
(c) processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obliga-
tion to which the controller is subject; or
(d) processing is necessary in order to protect the vital inter-
ests of the data subject; or
(e) processing is necessary for the performance of a task car-
ried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official
authority vested in the controller or in a third party to
whom the data are disclosed; or
(f) processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate
interests pursued by the controller or by the third party
or parties to whom the data are disclosed, expect where
such interests are overridden by the interests for funda-
mental rights and freedoms of the data subject which re-
quire protection under Article 1(1).51
The characteristic of digital currency, which makes it useful for
53. Directive, supra note 5, art. 26, O.J. L 281/31, at 46 (1995).
54. Id. art. 7, O.J. L 281/31, at 40 (1995).
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global electronic commerce, is that it crosses national borders
unchanged. Digital currency is not the subject of any one sover-
eignty, and thus digital currency issuers would likely be subject
to both Articles 7 and 25.
Digital currency issuers under any model, except the fully
anonymous protocol, will be "processing personal data" as de-
fined by the EC Directive even if it is by automatic means. The
traditional transfer of personal information in a wire transfer or
other international payment is generally permitted under the
EC Directive because such information is needed to make the
payment work. Under Article 7, the information can be
processed because it is "necessary for the performance of a con-
tract." Under Article 26, it may be transferred to a third country
without adequate levels of protection because "it is necessary for
the performance of a contract to which the data subject is a
party." Similarly, processing of data by credit card issuers is per-
mitted because it is a "necessary for the performance of a con-
tract."
The previous discussion of alternative digital currency
schemes demonstrates that collection of personal data is not nec-
essary for a digital currency transaction to work. When a prod-
uct is in the development stages, as is the case with digital cur-
rency, it is prudent to design the product to comply with the
relevant laws. Therefore, if the mechanism or structure of digi-
tal currency does not require the processing of personal data,
then designated digital currency, which creates a free flow of
personal data, would be prohibited under Article 7 and would
not fall within any of the derogations of Article 26. It would be
logical for issuers of digital currency to endeavor to comply with
the EC Directive. Consequently, it is likely that anonymous digi-
tal currency will emerge as the dominant player in the digital
currency or electronic cash market.
In addition to the "necessary to the performance of a con-
tract" allowance in both Articles 7 and 26, these articles also al-
low personal data to be processed or transferred to third coun-
tries that lack adequate protection if it is necessary for "compli-
ance with a legal obligation" or if it is legally "required on
important public interest grounds." Opponents of the anony-
mous digital currency model, which primarily include the na-
tional security agencies of governments, may suggest that the
prevention of money laundering and other criminal activityjusti-
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fies the data collection of designated digital currency under
these public interest provisions.5 5 Current studies of the rela-
tionship between digital currencies and increases in money laun-
dering are not conclusive.
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Finally, the terms of the EC Directive that allow the process-
ing of personal data as long as the data subject gives his consent
may weaken the argument that the EC Directive will drive the
development of anonymous digital currency. Consumers with
large "privacy premiums" may demand anonymous digital cur-
rency in which case they would not give their consent. This situ-
ation again suggests that the EC Directive and its implementing
legislation will direct the development of digital currency to-
wards products that ensure privacy.
CONCLUSION
The electronic commerce industry for information will con-
tinue to expand as economic success in society becomes more
dependent upon having greater quantities and better quality in-
formation. The business of information dissemination will de-
pend upon having an efficient means to transfer small value
amounts or microtransactions. Digital currencies are uniquely
designed to satisfy this demand and, thus, will eventually be com-
monplace on the Internet. As the "information age" evolves,
consumers will continue to demand privacy protections. The
concern for individual data privacy protection, which has been
recognized by the implementation of the EC Directive, will likely
influence the development of financial services and digital cur-
rency in particular. Privacy abuses can be eliminated by imple-
mented technology solutions and will lead to the deployment of
anonymous digital currencies.
55. The Financial Action Task Force ("FATF"), which includes 26 member coun-
tries, is the world's leading anti-money laundering authority. The FATF issued a paper
on Money Laundering in 1996, which offered recommendations on how to stop money
from freely traveling the globe, see United States Embassy, Isreal, Financial Action Task
Force Paper on Money Laundering (visitedJune 9, 1999) <http://dns.usis-israel.org.il/pub-
lish/econews/1996/ecojuly/eco_701b.htm> (on file with the Fordham International Law
Journal), and in April 1998, the FATF sought for further cooperation from the global
community to stop money laundering, U.S. Information Service Israel, Ministerial Meet-
ing Statement on Money Laundering (Apr. 29, 1998) (visited June 9, 1999) <http://
www.usis-israel.org.il/publish/econews/1998/april/eco429c.html> (on file with the
Fordham International Law Journal).
56. Timothy Ehrlich, Note, To Regulate or Not? Managing the Risks of E-Money and
The Potential Application in Money Laundering Schemes, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 833 (1998).
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